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Behind the Numbers: Conditions of Schooling in Boston 
This article includes portions of a report on the structure, governance, operations, and 
effectiveness of the Boston School Committee that was commissioned by the Boston Municipal 
Research Bureau in 1980. The passages provide an overview of the mandate, background, and 
recommendations, examining how a set of prominent professionals and citizens viewed the 
problem facing school department governance, including its isolation and the longstanding 
credibility gap fueled by patronage politics. It also looks at continued tensions between 
“equality” and “quality,” which occupied the heart of court-ordered desegregation; rising 
demands on a system that lacked the capacity to serve a broad array of students; and the 
continued problems of securing financial support. Also presented is a thumbnail history of public 
schooling in Boston that traces mid-twentieth-century efforts by black parents and other 
reformists to secure civil rights and a decent education for all of Boston’s children and shows 
the evolution of advocacy for better management and cost-effectiveness that occurred alongside 
cries for more equitable and just performance. It concludes by showing the challenges facing an 
entrenched school bureaucracy confronting modern demands for educational, social, 
management, and fiscal accountability—challenges that continue to be apparent in 2018. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Foreword 
This is a report on the structure of governance and management in the Boston Public Schools. It 
was commissioned by the Boston Municipal Research Bureau by letter contract of December 4, 
1980, to Marcy Murninghan, in association with Othello Mahone, and was supported by a grant 
of the Permanent Charities Fund. 
As commissioned, the report treats these topics: 
 the structural conditions and needs of the school system, insofar as 
accountability and perceptions of performance are concerned; 
 the efficacy of present governance arrangements: the existing electoral process 
of the School Committee; its mode of operation; and the respective roles of 
Committee and Superintendent; 
 the patterns of school department intergovernmental relations, in particular the 
city and the state;   
 the role of the courts and their impact on the system; and 
 the governance of the Boston schools as compared to other major school 
systems in the United States. 
In the current context of financial and educational disarray, the report builds on several 
contemporary studies and analyses of the Boston Public Schools. It also captures the 
observations of a number of knowledgeable people involved in school affairs over the years. 
Finally the authors have had the advantage of direct knowledge on a work-a-day basis of the 
system. Sections II, VII, and X describe the current problems of isolation, non-performance, and  
Portions of Behind the Numbers: Conditions of Schooling in Boston (Boston Municipal Research Bureau, 1981). 
Reprinted by permission of the Boston Municipal Research Bureau.    
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finance in the Boston Public Schools. Sections III, IV, V, VI, and VII analyze the historical, 
political, and structural factors that contribute to these problems. Section IX compares and 
contrasts educational problems in Boston and models of school system governance with other 
urban districts across the country. Section X outlines potential remedies suggested by the 
interview subjects. Finally, Section XI defines alternative short-term and long-term governance 
options and concludes with recommendations for: 
 an immediate period of interim relief so that internal educational, fiscal, and 
managerial reform can be carried out. The proposed vehicle for such an interim 
phase is a “Commission for the Boston Public Schools,” comprising members 
representing the School Committee, the Mayor, the State Board of Education, 
the Citywide Parents Advisory Council, the Boston Home and School 
Association, and the Court-ordered Partnerships; legislation which would create 
a trigger mechanism for state administrative intervention as an alternative to 
judicial intervention in those instances where a school system is on the verge of 
breaking down; 
 a reorganized School Committee that is enlarged and characterized by district 
representation. The Committee’s responsibility would be for educational 
policymaking rather than day-to-day management. This model presumes a 
strengthened superintendency. Membership on the new Committee would be 
for four-year, staggered terms with the Mayor serving in an ex officio capacity. 
The character of district boundaries in achieving desegregation, community 
coherence, and healthy political competition goals would determine the number 
of Committee seats. 
Gratitude is extended to several individuals who read and reacted to earlier drafts of this 
report. Their comments and contributions were especially helpful. They include Stephen 
Bailey, Francis Keppel, and Jerome Murphy of Harvard’s Graduate School of Education, 
and Robert Bohn, Joseph Barresi, Joseph Cronin, Joseph Slavet, Harry Durning, and 
Samuel Tyler. 
 
Behind the Numbers: Conditions of Schooling in Boston 
“I feel like one of the astronauts,” confided the principal of a large elementary school in Boston 
this spring. All of us do. We’re just going around and around in space, all by ourselves. Our tiles 
have fallen off and no one seems to care. We need help. 
This man has worked in the Boston Public Schools for over thirty years and was expressing 
a view held by many, both within and outside of the oldest public school system in America. A 
once proud system has been severely rocked by crisis after crisis over the past nine months, all of 
which have been well publicized: the firing of a Superintendent; a three week bus strike; the 
indictment, conviction, and sentencing of a School Committee member; the brinksmanship 
politics of finding the money to keep the schools open for the state-mandated 180-day school 
year; the tragic death of an acting Superintendent who had served the Boston Public Schools for 
all of his professional life. 
Inside the School Department, morale is as low as it has ever been as personnel go to work 
each day to wonder if their next paycheck will be their last or what other shock will occur. 
Students receive instruction from teachers who are uncertain over their futures and whether or 
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not lesson plans can be completed from week to week. Younger children who developed 
relationships with their peers and with their teachers do not know whether or not they will see 
them again, and older children do not know whether or not they will graduate. Parents who have 
endured this school year debate over dinner tables the prospect, if they can afford it, of sending 
their young to private or parochial schools where stability seems guaranteed. Parents who have 
no option other than the public schools feel abandoned and betrayed as the city moves closer and 
closer to creating a permanent underclass that is multiracial and linked by conditions of poverty 
and powerlessness. 
Outside the School Department, lawyers, judges, elected, and appointed officials and 
representatives of the financial community—often with little knowledge, sensitivity or concern 
for the operation of the schools—busy themselves in continual negotiations and posturing within 
their respective forums. They seek somehow to assure that the education process will continue 
uninterrupted—and that they will not be blamed if it is. Local church leadership has spoken out, 
seeking reconciliation of divergent goals and the assurance that what has happened this year will 
not happen again. Local and national media continue to churn out stories about the shaken state 
of education in the Athens of America, even attracting the interest of highbrow literary social 
critics who enjoy observing the spectacle. 
All of the actors engaged in seeking a solution for the Boston Public Schools over the past 
several months have, of necessity, focused on immediate factors which are quantifiable: 
 the minimum number of school days required by state education statutes; 
 the actual number of dollars already expended as well as required to continue 
Department operations through this year; 
 the number of school buildings to be closed pending Federal Court approval; 
and 
 the numbers of both student assignment and staff appointments that comply 
with outstanding desegregation orders. 
Claims and counterclaims over the validity of their numbers are hurled back and forth as 
various proposals are debated. Repetitive cycles have emerged as each decision-making body 
deliberates proposals before it, then anticipates action before others. The public—including those 
who send their children to schools—has become numbed by the relentless stream of 
announcements, none of which hold out the promise of resolution so that schooling in Boston 
might continue without interruption. 
Behind the numbers, however, is the question of the capacity of the Boston Public Schools 
to withstand external forces which have contributed to educational decline and disarray. Behind 
the numbers is the question of the capacity of personnel within the Boston Public Schools to go 
about the business of teaching and learning without feeling “lost in space.” Behind the numbers 
is the question of the capacity of the Boston Public Schools to assure the provision of quality 
education to a student population which is becoming increasingly black or other minority from 
economically impoverished backgrounds. Behind the numbers is the question of the capacity of 
the Boston Public Schools—and the City of Boston—to provide for an educated citizenry critical 
to the well-being of city life. Behind the numbers, then, are questions about quality, 
responsiveness and representation so that the young people of this city might know that they, 
and their futures, are cared for. 
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Problem Setting: Views from the Sidelines 
An analysis of the deficiencies of the Boston school system and its governance structure begins 
with how the system is perceived, not only by the public at large and the media, but also by 
knowledgeable, thoughtful observers who have or have had a substantial involvement with the 
schools, but are not “of it.” Instead, they represent institutions and sectors which have a concern 
for the system, or are affected directly or indirectly by school performance because they have 
unique vantage points. This section then deals with the results of twenty-six interviews which 
were carefully chosen to ensure a wide range of involvement and knowledge. These interviews 
yielded the following definitions of the problem: 
 The Credibility Gap: An Isolated System 
 Making It Work: A Non-Performing System 
 Money: An Expensive System 
 
The Credibility Gap: An Isolated System 
An overwhelming majority of respondents characterized the major problem facing the School 
Department as stemming from a lack of credibility, due largely to system isolation, secretiveness, 
and a lack of accountability. Nurtured by a cultivated institutional parochialism, tolerated by 
public indifference, the school system has fashioned a world unto itself. Within this broad 
consensus are more specific references to: the lack of constituent support; confusion over 
governance and the distribution of authority among the Department, City, and State; and the 
view that the Boston Public Schools represent a “vestige of our social past” when patronage in 
municipal service became a way of life and job security became more important than the 
provision of education. The isolation of the Boston Public Schools from the mainstream of city 
life appears to be chosen as much as imposed; only recently have School Department operations 
been open to scrutiny. One basic consequence of isolation is reduced credibility, especially if 
there is perceived to be a mismatch between the purpose of the school system (that is, serving 
children) and what occurs in practice (that is, serving employers). A cycle of public frustration 
and disinterest then sets in, reinforcing the system’s impulse to isolation. 
 
Constituent Support: The Elusive Crowd 
Many people have commented on the fact that the public schools appear to have no constituency. 
“Constituency,” according to Webster’s, is defined as a group of citizens entitled to elect a 
representative to a legislative or other public body; the residents of an electoral district; a group 
or body that patronizes, supports or offers representation; or the people involved in or served by 
an organization or institution. Insofar as Bostonians are concerned, community reaction to the 
threatened shut-down of the public schools this spring was minimal. Well-publicized 
demonstrations occurred in response to police and fire layoffs and station closings. For the 
schools, there was no grassroots activity, leading many to wonder if there is a public school 
constituency or, if there is, what it looks like. 
“The problem with the Boston Public Schools is the small role that it plays in the city’s life,” 
said one observer. “I have the growing sense that there are large numbers of people in this town 
who are learning to live without the schools.” One measure of constituent “abandonment,” as one 
official put it, is voter interest. “The schools in Boston don’t have a constituency,” commented 
an individual familiar with Boston’s political scene. “Most people who vote don’t have kids in 
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schools, and that’s a problem. It can result in little accountability.” Voting patterns for the School 
Committee tend to aggregate in certain parts of the city. Consequently, many of those who are 
elected to the School Committee discover there is a difference between the constituency which 
elects them and the constituency which is affected by their actions. “The general public needs to 
have confidence in the School Committee that they’re not continuously political animals,” 
observed one person knowledgeable about the public school system as well as the parochial 
schools. “I think,” said another, “that in general there’s a lack of educational concerns (by the 
School Committee members) due to a greater interest in the small political gains to be made by 
the individual. This adds up to a system with limited public support abandoned by the political 
leadership and local influentials. One result of this is that the kids go elsewhere.” 
Another measure of abandonment is demographic. Recent census data describe population 
shifts in, out and around the City of Boston. These shifts have affected enrollment patterns by 
increasing the number of black and other minority students. Demographic shifts pertain not just 
to numbers but also to composition of a given population. “The Boston Public Schools is making 
a feeble attempt at educating the poor and alienated segments of our society. As the result of a 
variety of events, there’s a new group of people (in the system) who are being measured by 
standards which are not applicable. The client now is not a member of the mainstream of society, 
and that’s a problem,” stated one source. “Given the nature of Boston’s population these days, 
any articulation of educational objectives would by necessity contain a very high component of 
those aspects of elementary and secondary education we have come to call ‘remedial.’ This label 
of remediation is a bad one and should be abandoned, but the basic thrust is valid; that is, 
students must be taught basic skills, in addition to broader curriculum programs,” reflected one 
long-time participant-observer in school affairs. 
Other demographic factors include a lower birth rate and desegregation, which contribute to 
political abandonment. “Restoring confidence, not just by the parents, but by the general public, 
even those without children,” was one person’s definition of the problem. He went on to say that 
“much has been done to enhance the quality of the system—such as the magnet schools—but we 
have to do more. The numbers will continue to dwindle. Desegregation has led to disrepute in the 
minds of some but the problem of dwindling numbers creates other problems like school closings 
and staff reductions.” One official familiar with the process of desegregation noted, “The 
declining birthrate in the city as well as declining enrollment has put pressure on every point in 
the system. This underlies the growing alienation between the schools and other institutions in 
the City. It’s a question of priorities; that is, schools are not in a good position compared to, say, 
repair of the streets. There’s no support from politicians not connected to the schools.” 
 
Governance and Authority: Who’s On First? 
Contributing to the credibility gap facing the Boston Public Schools is the issue of governance 
and the distribution of power and authority. The performance of the School committee as a 
governing body and the way major decisions are made were cited as reasons for overall poor 
management and confusion over mission. “The problem with the Boston Public Schools is the 
governance of the system,” stated one official. “Stemming from that is basic management. 
There’s a long history there of weakness so the system creates its own problems more than any 
other urban school system in the country that I’ve seen. This permeates everywhere, all the way 
to custodians, equipment, and supplies. There are some awfully good people at all levels but the 
weaknesses frustrate their efforts, even though it’s not necessarily intentional.” 
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“The motivating force of the school system is internal to the organization and is not related 
to the product. Most of the decisions, goals and operations are driven by the needs of people 
inside the system. The organization has learned over the past five years to use the courts to its 
own advantage. There’s no relationship between price and product and no one can be held 
accountable,” commented and observer familiar with School Department management practices. 
“Since the Committee is not responsible for taxing,” he continued, “and is only responsible for 
spending—and not even that entirely—it is not a legitimate governing body. If it stays elected, it 
should have the power to tax; if it doesn’t, it should be abolished.” “I’m not sure the political 
structure gives you people who care about education,” said one individual from the private 
sector. “The purpose of the system is to teach. They’re (the School Committee) looking for other 
things—not education.” 
Observed another familiar with the intergovernmental aspects: “The problem has to do with 
all those involved, except for the kids. There’re too many key, important factions which don’t 
work together, go their own way and ignore the fact that the others exist. Since each has power 
and authority, they’re hard to ignore. They’re integral: the Mayor, the School Committee, and the 
State Commissioner / Department / Board of Education. Each can unilaterally throw a monkey 
wrench into the operation and there’s a minimal effort to cooperate. What suffers is the School 
Department and the kids because there’s no one to override their decision; they have their own 
spheres.”  
“The system is too big to administer,” stated an individual knowledgeable about the 
relationship of the school system to local postsecondary education. “The final decision-makers 
are too far away from the delivery of services which produces an accountability problem with 
attendant corruption and a violation of what it’s there for.” 
 
Patronage Politics: Job Security vs. Education 
Many of our respondents believe that a major problem besetting the School Department is 
mediocrity among the personnel ranks. They saw the primacy of job security over concern for 
quality education as the product of isolation and politics over the past 100 years. “The School 
Committee members tend to protect their appointees,” commented one familiar with School 
Committee practices. “Some of this has been eliminated but it still exists; there are still 
incompetent administrators.” 
“The schools are so insular. The personnel all come from the same background—there’s a 
sort of defensiveness there, or provincialism. They all went to the same school, they speak the 
same language. Someone who doesn’t fit the mold can’t fit in. I’ve noticed, too, a Boston school 
Department-ese in their language. It seems there’s a lack of matching skills to jobs—all you need 
to know is the glossary of terms. The School Committee seems to be more of an employment 
agency than an education agency,” were the perceptions of one official. “One problem with the 
School Department,” stated one person, “is the absence of bright, young career people interested 
in doing a job in the public sector.” 
Stronger comments were made by another long-time observer of the Boston Public Schools. 
“The school system doesn’t educate young people,” was the flatly put statement of one 
gentleman. “It’s always ‘Save your ass week’ over there. It’s an entrenched bureaucracy where 
social reform is unwelcome and unacceptable.” 
“Boston was significantly transformed by the immigrant takeover of municipal government 
and the mentality of immigrant groups who finally controlled the reins of government and 
patronage. The typical ‘political boss’ governing cities is gone now but a sub-strata remain 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
7 
within the bureaucracy. These patterns of patronage predate the New Deal. They are 
institutionalized attitudes towards the public payroll which are destructive and out-of-date 
insofar as the larger social order is concerned. The taxpayers of today are residents of the city 
who are now facing up to the problems of supporting a patronage-laden establishment. It took 
fifty years to create the concept of patronage and it’s the biggest obstacle to change,” stated one 
official familiar with Boston’s historical development. 
 
Making It Work: A Non-Performing System 
A second broad category of problem-setting emerges from our interviews: public disappointment 
in the achievements of the Boston Public Schools and its failure to measure up to standards of 
educational excellence. These issues are not, of course, restricted to Boston. In Boston, however, 
questions about purpose and quality can be understood by also examining: system coherence and 
receptivity to new demands; the character of media coverage of the schools, which influences 
parental decision-making; and other expectations which go beyond the acquisition of basic skills. 
 
Quality and Equality. The capacity of the Boston Public Schools to respond to demands for 
quality and equality is part of a larger social policy debate. Definitions of equality, especially 
concerning public education, have centered for the last quarter century around issues of access. 
Since 1954, the courts have focused on “access” as a remedy to previous practices which 
perpetuated inequities. Within the last several years, however, the definition of inequality has 
begun to shift. The distribution of resources, standards of achievement and equity in educational 
outcomes have emerged as measures of “success” so that discussions about quality and equality 
in education have become more politicized. 
In response to the question about the major problem currently facing the school system, one 
definitive response was the following: “There is only one problem and that is the poor quality of 
education taking place. The broad general reason for the poor quality of education in the Boston 
Public Schools today is simply that all parties involved have either lost sight of the purpose of 
the schools—that is, to deliver high quality education—or have given other objectives higher 
priority, or both.” 
Another respondent also characterized the problem as ambiguity over mission. “What 
they’re trying to do has been adrift since the 1930s. Concerns about the purpose of public 
education lost its way in the 30s as preoccupations with employment, opportunity, the 
redistribution of wealth, and the emergence of other smaller public agenda began to occur. The 
issue of race was yet another and created a new population for the school establishment. The 
Mann era is over. Now we’re in the era of why Johnny can’t read and village school downtown. 
This is not just in Boston but in other areas, too. In the Boston Public Schools, there is a lack of 
overall élan or mission.” 
Inequality as a result of resource distribution was a major topic—sometimes referred to as 
“tracking”—in our interviews. “The educational problems facing the schools,” stated one 
individual familiar with the process of desegregation, “include the fact that excellence is only 
expected in a few schools so meager resources are given to a selected few. The system is geared 
to a certain segment of the overall school population, that is, the low number of students going 
on to higher education. There’s a minor emphasis on vocational education. We still don’t 
understand the total failure in the system or even the successes.” 
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The Medium Is the Message: Consumer Choice. On the issue of public perceptions of the 
Boston Public Schools, several respondents commented on the role of the media and alternative 
schools in shaping public opinion. “The general public does not believe that the schools are very 
effective,” stated one official whose children are enrolled in the school system. “They only see 
the court cases and rising costs. Until they see stability you don’t have a group of loyal 
supporters. ‘I’ll find another school for my child’ is the attitude. There is no grassroots 
commitment to improving the schools. Those people could make a difference if there weren’t an 
alternative.” 
“It’s a perceptual problem,” commented a person familiar with minority struggles in Boston. 
“Competitive interests (alternate schools) are advantaged by the perception that the Boston 
Public Schools are in trouble. You don’t see Ford or GM commercials where they say that the 
other product is ‘bad.’ Negative advertising is going on. The perceptual problem of the quality of 
our schools is the biggest handicap. Individual schools are not chosen on qualitative grounds but 
on what the neighbors think. This is a function of race and class; we’re in the process of setting 
up a dual school system comprised of the poor and the non-poor.” 
“There are competing interests,” commented one official knowledgeable of political 
practices in Boston. “There are a number of groups. . . . Maybe it boils down to two, who see the 
system as either a resource for economic development or a resource for technical skill transfer. . . 
.The first group has a history of use of the tax buck as a resource and has effectively organized 
for the Boston Public Schools to become its ongoing vehicle. . . . The second group doesn’t have 
a history of concerted, effective utilization of service in a climate that has no media or public 
relations support. A lot of people are not being told that they’re going to good schools, as in 
Newton or Brookline.” Citing the historical lack of support for public education on the part of 
the business community and Boston mayors, this individual went on to suggest that an 
examination of other urban school systems with strong parochial systems be undertaken to see if 
the public systems are any more healthy. 
 
Other Expectations. Public expectations for schooling go far beyond the acquisition of 
basic skills and open access by young people. Expectations concerning personal and moral 
development, social justice, and economic opportunity are mixed in with instructional goals and 
learning processes. Two individuals provided insight into public perceptions of the purpose of 
schooling, claiming that public education is essentially a reflection of larger societal conditions 
which are unstable. “Attendant to busing, where many people did not choose to become involved 
in an experiment which affected their children, the general problem is a lack of standards, 
primarily in the areas of discipline and knowledge. A sort of dismantling of standards began to 
occur in the mid-‘60s,” one man involved in school reform initiatives observed. “This, matched 
with the implementation of desegregation, bilingual, and special needs education all in the same 
year, reflected an explosive domestic revolution which affected everybody. The teaching corps 
found these new populations a bit rougher and less respectful of authority. There’s no simple 
answer, but since the family structure within a school has eroded as well, although there are a 
couple of examples in the Boston schools where there is an esprit de corps and firm standards.” 
Said the other, “The demands for social services in cities have outstripped the capacity to 
provide. The best people are driven out rather than attracted to urban settings. The worst job in 
major older cities is the mayor’s job. The second worst job is the superintendent’s. The absence 
of a stable, secure middle class in the cities is a function of demands for social services which 
changed expectations and deprived the middle class of assurances of security so they retreated. 
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The city . . . . and the schools . . . . are the final and ultimate victims of overpromising the good 
life.” 
 
Money: An Expensive System 
In addition to system isolation and non-performance, a third category of problem-definition 
focused on finance: the cost of the school system and the conditions of fiscal accountability. This 
issue dominates current public consciousness. Many describe the School Committee’s fiscal 
status as “semi-autonomous” because under current law, a “floor” on expenditures equal to the 
prior year’s appropriation is guaranteed. Compounding the problem, the felt, was ineffective City 
Hall monitoring or oversight of expenditure processes; the Mayor and the City Council only deal 
with the School Department’s budget on a lump sum basis and confusion exists in the respective 
responsibilities of the Business Manager for the Schools and the City Auditor. In addition, in 
1966 the General Court, by law, separated the budget for school operating purposes and the 




Under these circumstances, consensus exists over the need to establish firmer controls over 
processes of budgetary expenditures and auditing. “The public perception is that the School 
Committee is extravagant or loose with funds,” commented one observer. “There’s an inefficient 
management of funds which is reflected in the union contracts and the [Chapter] 766 program. 
There’s no mechanism for adequately controlling the wasteful machine which spends more 
money than it has to. This is grounded in the structure of school autonomy and the questions of 
who’s in charge. There’s a divided responsibility for raising the money and spending the 
money.” 
“I believe that there is irresponsible fiscal management,” stated another person, also a parent 
of children enrolled in the Boston Public Schools. “After reviewing the budget and comparing it 
with other cities, I can’t understand how it costs Boston double for the same number of kids. I 
look at the budget for items like toilet paper and then I can’t find any toilet paper in the schools. 
It’s appalling.” 
“I don’t agree with the system of separation of fiscal authority. I would like to hold the 
Mayor responsible,” said a local chief executive. “Chapter 766 has created serious budget 
problems and can be used as an excuse for poor performance. . . .  Boston has a dichotomy in its 
school system but no tax base to finance it properly. I think we need a metropolitan structure; the 
solution is more than increased real estate taxes or state aid.” 
One lawyer remarked, “Money is colossally wasted in the Department but the money 
problem is mixed with the problem of credibility. There’s a loss of confidence in the schools and 
not enough money even if the system were run efficiently.” 
“There has to be an honest reorganization of fiscal realities,” declared another official and 
parent of school-age children. “You don’t shrink from 96,000 to 65,000 students without 
readjustments.” 
“The problem with the school system is that there are no systems in place to tell how much 
is being spent. Purchasing in the Department is not like Springfield or Worcester where it’s 
routine but is rather done by exception. The problem is not an inadequate budget but how money 








Definitions about the problems facing the Boston Public Schools are very much shaped by the 
experience of the individual making the assessment. Nevertheless, there is general consensus 
regarding problems created by the isolation, non-performance, and cost of the school system. 
The immediate fiscal crisis emerges, then, as the result of these three conditions. “Bailing out the 
schools” through the provision of additional monies will not correct them. Behind the numbers, 
these conditions of schooling in Boston have historical, political, and structural roots. Before 
proper remedies for the governance and operations of the Boston Public Schools become evident, 
the nature of the historical, political, and structural forces at work needs to be described. We 
analyze these forces in our next sections. 
 
Conditions of Schooling in Boston: Vestiges of Our Social Heritage 
Established in 1635, the oldest school system in America, the Boston Public Schools has 
undergone generations of change—and has endured. From colonial requirements of rudimentary 
education, to 19th century needs to assimilate successive waves of immigrants, through meeting 
the increasing skill requirements of an industrial society, the schools have evolved to face the 
present challenge of providing an effective contemporary education for entirely new school 
populations in a desegregated system. The school system has undertaken these changing 
assignments, especially in this century, with relatively few changes in organization or 
governance. Historically, old structures have struggled to carry out new responsibilities. 
The Early Phase: Colonial and Revolutionary Causes and Effects 
A sketch of the Boston Public Schools begins with the objectives established by the colonists. 
Schools were created as a result of local initiatives and were a mediating extension of the 
household and the church. The dominant theology was Puritan in the northeast and Anglican in 
the middle and southern colonies. As Lawrence M. Cremin describes in Traditions of American 
Education, models of schooling were oriented toward basic values of piety, civility, and learning. 
Of the three elements—family, church, and schools—the family shouldered the primary burden 
of education.2 
The church, too, provided an important function in systematically conveying teachings on 
matters ranging from ontological questions of being to more practical issues of day-to-day living. 
As we find true in neighborhoods in Boston today, congregations were strong and typically 
included whole families. The transmittal of instruction therefore typically followed an 
uninterrupted course between houses of family life and houses of worship, a pattern which 
continues to characterize parochial schooling. 
Given the dominance of family life and the church, the early schools were often marginal in 
performing an educational role. Modeled after the English two-track system of petty schools and 
grammar schools, schools in Massachusetts Bay either provided rudimentary instruction in 
reading and writing or trained young boys in the finer points of Latin, Hebrew, and Greek. A 
small proportion of those attending grammar schools went on to learned professions; the 
founding of Harvard College in 1636 provided such an opportunity for the first graduates of the 
Boston Latin School. This “two-tier” form of public schooling, unique to East Coast urban 
systems, continues today with the preservation of the three Exam schools.  
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The decades preceding the Revolution saw the institutionalization and secularization of 
schooling. With independence came a new emphasis on the need for an informed, stable, and 
independent citizenry. The popularization of education was off and running as Jefferson 
enshrined the “unique function” of public education in American political ideology. In 
Massachusetts, the General Court in 1789 established a school district system with authority 
vested in separate governing bodies—“school committees”—and, by 1830, they were in place 
throughout the state. The Boston School Committee was created in 1789 (prior to the 
incorporation of the City) and comprised ward representatives. After City incorporation in 1822, 
membership on the Committee included the Mayor, the President of the Common Council, and a 
representative from each of the city’s twelve wards. Boston continued in the forefront of the 
colonial revolutionary traditions: Education was a preeminent public function and an 
independent local body was the chosen instrument. 
 
Immigration and Industrialization 
In the 19th century, two forces emerged which were to change this emphasis: immigration and 
industrialization. A rapid influx of immigrants (in particular the Irish) and the process of 
industrialization (which moved work from households to offices, shops, and factories) changed 
the character of political participation heretofore restricted to Yankee Protestants and 
underscored the utility of schooling as a vehicle for economic development. 
The presence of newcomers created political pressures to “democratize” school governance, 
heretofore dominated by the Yankees. In 1854, the Boston City Charter was revised to increase 
the number of ward representatives on the School Committee from one to six, thereby raising the 
entire Committee membership to seventy-four. The decentralized school structure served as an 
effective entry point for the newcomers to local politics. By 1874, the number of Committee 
seats had expanded to 116 as the City annexed new areas; the ward machines had by then taken 
over with their now-familiar practices of sanctions and rewards. 
As the Irish came to dominate the local Boston political process, the Yankees countered by 
increasing the role of the state in local affairs. Prior to 1885, a small group of Yankee reformers, 
concerned about the unwieldiness of the 116-person School Committee and the prevalence of 
what they considered wastefulness and poor quality, gained legislative approval to establish a 24-
person board elected citywide, over the opposition of the Catholic community. In 1885, after the 
election of Hugh O’Brien, the first Irish Catholic Mayor of Boston, the legislature relieved the 
Mayor of his ex-officio duties on the School Committee and delegated personnel nomination 
powers to the Board-appointed Superintendent.  
It should be noted the late nineteenth and early twentieth century prejudice was not aimed 
solely at the Irish. In the 1880s, a wave of immigrants beginning from Southern and Eastern 
Europe also generated hostility and encouraged some Yankee-Irish alliances. As Stephen 
Thernstrom points out in The Other Bostonians: 
 
By the turn of the century Boston School Committee members of Irish descent 
had arrived at a certain modus vivendi with their Yankee colleagues, both groups. 
Deploring the “new immigrants” and calling for more strenuous efforts to 
“Americanize” them via the public school system.3  
 
In 1905, James Jackson Storrow led another reform movement to obtain legislative approval 
for replacing the 24-person Committee with mayor-appointed three-to seven-person board. This 
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initiative was partially thwarted by suffragists who could only vote in School Committee 
elections. Consequently, the state legislature passed Chapter 349 of the Acts of 1905 which 
created the current five-member, elected at-large structure. 
Simultaneous to the process of immigration, the second force—the process of 
industrialization—created new labor demands in low-mobility categories. For immigrants in 
Boston this demand did not include access to the skilled or managerial occupational sectors: 
indeed, for many newcomers, industrialization and urbanization was a phenomenon unfamiliar in 
their homeland. In partial response to the obstacles of assimilation, Boston’s ethnic 
neighborhoods grew strong, providing religious, social, political, recreational, educational, and 
economic services. Occupationally, the Irish established a solid base in local government. Their 
success in politics, however, was not matched by success in the private economy. 
Given the existence of economic discrimination and neighborhood solidarity, the ethnic 
groups consequently had lowered expectations of public schools. Insofar as jobs were concerned, 
many families viewed work as a source of livelihood; a job was routine and not a part of a larger 
career plan, requiring extensive educational preparation and leading to economic or social 
advancement. Therefore, schooling focused on basic skills and, in the case of parochial schools, 
the preservation of the value system of immigrant parents. In general, the public schools were 
not viewed as a stepping-stone to the “good life” for children of newcomers. After schooling 
ended the options for housing and employment frequently weren’t there. Instead the schools 
became a vehicle for acquiring political power—and job security—as well as a battleground for 
ethnic-religious conflicts. 
Economic Preservation, Civil Rights, and Schooling: Three Decades of Ferment 
Throughout the 1920s and the Depression no structural modifications occurred in the Boston 
Public Schools although the pattern of patronage in appointments flourished since jobs were hard 
to come by. After World War II a series of reform initiatives focused on the capacity of the 
School Committee and the School Department to respond to the new demands of the urban 
environment. The Strayer report of the mid-forties; the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
‘60s; the League of Women Voters plan, the Peat, Marwick and Mitchell report, the Cronin 
report, the Home Rule Commission and Committee for Boston proposals of the ‘70s; and the 
push for reorganization spearheaded by David Finnegan and culminating in Chapter 333 in 
1977–78 were reforms grounded in concerns about equity and managerial efficacy. These reform 
initiatives were to have little impact, however, upon the Boston Public Schools which had 
become historically and politically impervious to change. 
 
The Move toward Efficiency. In 1944, the Boston Finance Commission commissioned 
Professor George Strayer of Columbia to head a study team analyzing the operations of the 
school system and the conditions of its governance. Dr. Strayer was a disciple of the scientific 
management approach of Frederick Taylor. Scientific management concentrated on productivity 
measures in industrial settings; educational leaders quickly adapted some of these measurement 
concepts and applied them to school systems. The eight-volume Strayer report provided 
elaborate functional analyses of the instructional and business activities of the school system. 
They took into account what Strayer considered negative “socio-political” factors in the 
environment which influence organizational behavior. Included in the Strayer recommendations 
was a proposal that the five-person School Committee structure be abolished and replaced by a 
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board appointed by the Mayor from a list of names provided by a screening committee of civic 
and professional leaders and college presidents. The rationale was that “politics” was destroying 
the system and that reform should be oriented toward depoliticization. The Strayer 
recommendations were unpopular because they challenged strongly held beliefs about 
democratic control over schooling and represented a threat to strongly entrenched patronage 
practices. Consequently, the key Strayer recommendations were not accepted. 
 
New Populations, New Demands. Since the Brown decision of 1954, with more resistance 
than “all deliberate speed,” public education in most American cities has taken place in 
desegregated settings. When desegregation came to Boston, the schools—as well as the city of 
Boston—were ill-prepared to accept the Supreme Court ruling. Little if anything was done to 
assure that black children would receive instruction equal to that provided to white children. A 
separate system-within-a-system continued to be maintained as School Committees were elected 
and re-elected. 
Political leadership in the City ignored the existence of the two public systems, yet within 
living rooms, neighborhoods, and churches a reform movement grew. Between 1961 and 1974, 
open conflict broke out over achieving equal public education for all children of Boston with the 
civil rights and other liberation movements serving as a national backdrop. Freedom schools, 
student walkouts, mass demonstrations, and occasional acts of violence had little effect on the 
School Committee or the Department. Each was unequipped and unwilling to acknowledge these 
new demands. Historically autonomous and inward-looking, staffed by an inbred personnel 
accustomed to other kinds of problems, the School Department proved incapable of responding 
to the new racial struggles. The intervention of the Federal District Court was necessary to assure 
that the provisions of the Supreme Court ruling of twenty years before would be carried out. 
Without reviewing in detail the history of the desegregation case in Boston as well as the 
circumstances and effects of the Federal Court’s omnibus orders, it is important to note that the 
Federal Court has played a most profound and enduring reform role in the Boston Public 
Schools. Through Court decree, the structure of the system has been fundamentally altered: nine 
Districts were created; a parent participation structure was adopted; student assignment plans 
were developed (and have not changed significantly since their original design); 
college/university/business pairings were established; the practice of a multiple-school 
principalship was eliminated; and affirmative action goals in personnel categories were set. None 
of these structural changes would have occurred as a result of Committee action. 
Besides the issue of racial equity, four other demands were placed upon the Department 
during the 1960s and 1970s. By legislative action and advocacy proceedings, the schools were 
called upon to provide quality education to populations which were historically 
underrepresented: poor children; bilingual students; and children with special needs. The push 
for equal access forced the Department to adapt its curriculum, personnel, and policies to the 
requirements of increasingly diverse populations. A special emphasis on job-related education—
culminating in the Hubert Humphrey Occupational Resource Center—also served to challenge 
the effectiveness of a vocational educational department widely considered to be outdated, 
fragmented, mediocre, and serving primarily as a tracking system for students who were 
considered to be “uneducable.” 
Taken together, these expectations—and battles—increased the pressure on the School 
Committee and the Department to transform itself so that new tasks and new assignments might 
be more effectively carried out. A spate of reform initiatives throughout the late 1960s and into 
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the 1970s took place and focused on governance and management. The Committee and the 
Department, however, were to continue its operations as before. 
 
A Litany of Reform Proposals. Paralleling the Strayer Report, the League of Women 
Voters offered a plan calling for an appointed board, assertion that this was the only way to 
“break through the present stalemate.”  In 1969 and 1970, the Home Rule Commission argued 
that one primary effect of the at-large structure was unequal representation among the various 
wards in the city. Its analysis emphasized the peculiar division of responsibility between the 
School Department and City Hall and provided three options: a School Committee elected by 
districts; an appointed School Committee; and abolition of the School Committee, placing the 
Department directly under the control of the Mayor and a mayorally appointed Commissioner of 
Education, with the assurance that a decentralization plan would be put in place. The final 
recommendation was for School Committee abolition and decentralization. 
After a yearlong study of the Boston Public Schools, a study undertaken at the request of the 
School Committee, directed by Joseph M. Cronin, and under the auspices of the Massachusetts 
Advisory Council on Education, recommended sweeping internal management reforms as well 
as proposals for structural reform. The Cronin report recommended a nine-person School 
Committee with six to be elected by district and three elected at-large or, based on testimony at 
home rule hearings, appointed by the Mayor with the consent of the City Council, “from a list of 
ten civic leaders who shall transmit to the Mayor twice as many names as exist vacancies.”4 
In 1974 a comprehensive analysis of the management needs of the Boston Public Schools 
was undertaken by Peat, Marwick and Mitchell. A series of proposals concerning information, 
fiscal, and personnel systems were made to the Superintendent and School Committee. 
In September of 1976, a four-person educational panel established by the Mayor issued a 
report entitled “Improving Boston Education.”  Panel recommendations included removal of the 
School Committee from day-to-day administrative involvement, appointment of a strong 
Superintendent with broad administrative powers and the preparation of plans for an elected 
School Committee of at least nine and no more than thirteen members with up to two-thirds of 
the members selected by geographical district. Once again, proposals were made for the creation 
of modern management and budget information systems. 
In 1976, the Committee for Boston was created by the Mayor under the leadership of 
Edward McCormack. Once again citing the deficiencies in the system, the Committee for 
Boston, in a report prepared under the direction of Joseph Slavet of the Boston Urban 
Observatory, proposed the expansion of the School Committee to fifteen members, serving four 
year terms, with elections entirely on a district basis.5  The report also recommended mayoral 
involvement in the appointment of the Superintendent. 
None of these plans were adopted. With the exception of the Court orders, the Boston Public 
Schools remained essentially intact. The consultant reports landed on shelves and collected dust. 
It was not until July of 1978 that a proposal for partial structural reform succeeded. 
 
Chapter 333 and New Hopes 
In December of 1977, School Committee President David Finnegan convened an advisory group 
which met over a period of three months in order to hammer out plans for a reorganization of the 
Boston Public Schools. Acting in response to the previous studies, the clear need to improve the 
conduct of labor relations and personnel management, and the need for system capacity to fulfill 
state-mandated competency requirements, the Finnegan group proposed a plan designed: 
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 to enhance significantly the power and authority of the Superintendent, thereby 
establishing a basic structure for educational and management accountability; 
 to provide a mechanism for integrating and consolidating all key management 
and operations functions to be carried out in support of the educational process; 
and 
 to streamline central and district administrative costs.6 
In preparing its report, the advisory group identified areas of the proposal that required 
statutory amendment. As a result, the City Council approved a home rule petition and the 
General Court approved Chapter 333 of the 1978 Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth. 
Chapter 333 was the first example of genuine structural reform since 1906. It provided the 
Superintendent with broadened powers and provided the mandate for further internal 
reorganization, a process carried out over the next two years. 
Despite the apparent mandate for institutional reorganization, there were, nevertheless, 
limits to Chapter 333 insofar as the power of the Superintendency was concerned. Under the 
statute, the School Committee continued to hold the authority for the abolition or creation of 
positions and maintained powers of appointment, transfer, and dismissal of personnel. Under 
current law, this authority cannot be delegated to the Superintendent even though the 
Superintendent serves as an agent of the School Committee. In addition, Chapter 333 did not 
fully address the question of contracting with teachers or other organized school personnel. The 
authority to “elect and contract” with teachers has been held to be vested exclusively in the 
School Committee under Chapter 71 of the General Laws in sections 37 and 38. By implication, 
this power includes the establishment of salaries which cannot be lawfully delegated to School 
Committee subordinates, to the mayor or to any other city official. 
Practically speaking, once Chapter 333 was enacted the Committee in 1978 chose to 
delegate responsibilities for the bargaining process to the Superintendent and his staff. 
Previously the Committee negotiated directly. Contract approval authority, however, still rests 
with the Committee. 
In addition to authorizing only a limited extension of the powers of the Superintendent, 
Chapter 333 did not affect the Charter-established Office of the Business Manager. Subsequent 
internal reorganization efforts to correlate budget systems with those of expenditure control and 
attempts to install effective management and information control systems (an important goal was 
the reconciliation of city and school accounting systems) were not successful. 
 
Summary 
Whatever the evolution of the oldest public school system in America in past centuries, the mid-
20th century created demands for which the system was ill-prepared. New social requirements, 
although carrying historical antecedents, coupled with public insistence on greater institutional 
accountability did not square well with a structure which had become, by the turn of the century, 
isolated, politically dominated, and essentially concerned with the preservation of job security. 
The initial colonial and revolutionary prominence given education on the public agenda waned; 
the commitment to public education in Boston became increasingly uncertain. A strong parochial 
and private school system continued to provide a viable alternative for middle-class Bostonians. 
By 1981, those who care about public education wonder what conditions are needed to 
recapture the spirit of the revolutionary and colonial initiative, eliminate the political domination 
and focus on the basic task: the provision of quality education for all young Bostonians. 





For purposes of this study, twenty-six interviews were conducted during January and February of 
1981, using the interview schedule which is attached. The respondents had the opportunity to 
review the initial synthesis of their statements. Re-interviewing took place during March and 
April to obtain additional perceptions and thoughts. The respondents are long-term observers of 
and participants in conditions of schooling in Boston. 
One of the conditions of the research was confidentiality. What follows is an occupational 




State Education Officials 2 
Bank President and Vice-President 2 
Elected Officials 3 
Youth Employment Directors 2 
Insurance Company President and Vice-President 2 
Lawyers 3 
Parochial Schools Expert 1 
College or University President 2 
Desegregation Officials 2 
Cultural Pairing Officials 2 
Corporation President 1 
City of Boston Official 1 
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